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Discussion After the Speeches of Deborah K. Owen
and Derek Ireland
ROBERT F. MATHIESON: Are there questions now for Deborah
or Derek?
BARRY D. SOLARZ: It does not surprise me that antitrust policy
in the United States or Canada is the general proposition because I think
that both countries are generally against anti-dumping law. The assumption behind this conference is, in fact, that by virtue of the FTA a substitute regime would involve replacing anti-dumping laws with antitrust
laws growing out of this agreement.
It is my understanding that the two sides have basically agreed to
disagree and to study the matter for another five to seven years, and consider a number of options. Does this group have any other options beside
replacement of anti-dumping laws by antitrust laws?
ROBERT F. MATHIESON: I can address your question as one of
the four members of the research team that considered this issue. The
replacement option was discussed at a number of different conferences
but was not stated as a particular objective. The charge given to this
research team was essentially to look at the feasibility and desirability
from an economic and equity standpoint of using government competition laws as a replacement for an anti-dumping regime.
The team did not look in depth at any other alternatives. By implication, the FTA does make a difference. Instead of asking, if the FTA is
working, why fix it, we should be compelled not to leave the agreement
half completed. If we are moving into a globally competitive environment, then the FTA has to make a difference. If, in fact, we are trying to
enlarge the competitive domain for industries in both Canada and the
United States, then the extent to which we can cross the border from a
commercial standpoint would make a difference to the extent that we can
add to commercial productivity. So investment decisions are not merely
made on getting around anti-dumping laws, but also on the basis of economic efficiency.
JONATHAN FRIED: The text of Article 1906 itself did not say
that the two governments agreed to disagree. It says the parties shall
establish a working group and use their best efforts to develop a substitute system. This is not to say that the working group must implement a
substantially different system, but it does mean that the current system is
not necessarily adequate, and that the two parties are to work towards
something better than the status quo. It is more than merely a mutual
agreement to disagree; it has some direction. So, I would not want to
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leave the impression that it is purely neutral regarding the possibility of
substitution and it is not just an implication, it is explicit in the text.
DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL: Ms. Owen, is it likely that the Federal Trade Commission will be consulted and play a role in the decisionmaking process of formulating a U.S. policy position regarding the direction of the Free Trade Agreement?
DEBORAH K. OWEN: I would hope so. We have some valuable
input that could be contributed throughout this process. As I mentioned, those who ultimately make these decisions are going to hear a
variety of views, but if this particular consideration is serious enough to
gather an entire conference, it would most likely provoke some inquiries
from the people who will ultimately be making the decisions.
DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL: Is this issue currently on the
agenda of the OEC competition committee?
DEBORAH K. OWEN: I am not sure.
KEITH MARTIN: How will Mexico affect this issue in the event
of trilateral agreement? How would this be handled versus competition
law?
DEREK IRELAND: Mexico does not have antitrust statutes at the
present time. They are planning to develop one, and there are many
countries showing an interest, including Eastern Europe and third world
countries, but the effects that would have on these negotiations is openended.
DEBORAH K. OWEN: We have a Federal Trade Commission delegation concerning Mexico. This delegation has discussed how we
should implement such a law, but I still see the need for protection.
WILLIAM G. DEEKS: One thing that has changed in the twentyfive years that I have been involved with trade issues is that such issues
had a domestic focus years ago. Today, they have become a more externally oriented. One of the benefits of trade liberalization is that it
removes a crutch for those businesses that want to use it to protect themselves in circumstances where they really are competitive. The competitive force is global, and within the industries I represent there are new
initiatives outside of environmental technology and global communication. The discussions we have been having here provide a model to enact
better competitive conditions for business, and uses of resources in foreign productivity.
ROBERT F. MATHIESON: We are indeed indebted to both
Deborah and Derek for making the commitment to share their personal
and insightful comments.

The Removal of Trade Remedy Law in Trans-Tasman Commerce
Graeme Thomson and ChristopherLangman*

A n innovative

commitment to free trade is taking shape in the Southern
Hemisphere. The free trade agreement between Australia and New
Zealand is, in key aspects, the most comprehensive such arrangement
between two sovereign nations to date. Particularly in relation to free
trade in goods and services and to the elimination of trade remedy law, it
has gone further and faster than any other free trade agreement. In the
context of debate on how best to implement Chapter Nineteen of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, it could well be of interest
to understand how and why Australia and New Zealand decided to dispense with anti-dumping measures for goods originating in the free trade
area and traded between their two countries.
Australia and New Zealand have substantial common interests.
They have been brought together by their geographical proximity and
sense of isolation, as well as by similar legal and political systems. At the
same time, both countries are major exporters of agricultural products
and share a crucial interest in the liberalization of the world market for
these products. Both countries are in the process of significantly liberalizing their own economies in an effort to make them more internationally
competitive.
Australia and New Zealand have sought to enhance economic cooperation through a series of bilateral trade agreements dating from 1922.
The most ambitious of these agreements is the Australia-New Zealand
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CERTA), which came
into force in 1983. CERTA's initial aims included the elimination of
tariffs by January 1988 and all quantitative restrictions by July 1995.
Considerable progress was made towards the reduction of barriers
to trade and investment flows between the two countries in the first five
years of CERTA, including the elimination of nearly all tariffs and all
direct export subsidies and incentives by the due dates in 1988. Bilateral
trade grew rapidly as barriers were reduced and the two governments
agreed to undertake an ambitious program to accelerate progress toward
* The authors are respectively the Minister (Commercial) and First Secretary (Commercial) at
the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the governments of Australia or New Zealand. It
draws on a range of sources including John Broome's paper, "Recent Developments in Trans-Tasman Business Law," delivered at the Seventeenth International Trade Law Conference, September
1990. Ian Govey at the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C. provided helpful comments on a
draft.
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a single market at the review of the Agreement in 1988. In making this
decision, Australia and New Zealand were mindful not only of the trade
creating effects of reduced protection, but also that CERTA was an important policy tool to facilitate and accelerate the process of structural
reform aimed to enhance international competitiveness, already underway in both countries.
At the 1988 Review, the two countries signed a number of additional instruments designed to accelerate the movement towards a single
trans-Tasman market. These included protocols to achieve free trade in
goods without exception and replace dumping law with competition law,
to liberalize trade in services through an innovative "negative list" approach (free trade is established for all services unless the service is inscribed in the Agreement) and to harmonize quarantine procedures so
that animal and plant quarantine administration does not include unjustifiable barriers to trade. Understandings were also reached on the harmonization of business law and on ways to deal with any problems
arising from differing technical standards. It was also agreed that export
incentives and production bounties on goods which are exported to the
other country would be eliminated, and that other support measures
which might distort competition between industries would be avoided.
Under the 1988 Protocol on the Acceleration of Free Trade in
Goods, Australia and New Zealand agree to eliminate the few remaining
tariffs, quantitative import restrictions and tariff quotas on goods from
the other country by July 1, 1990. Article 4 of the Protocol provides that
neither country will take anti-dumping action against goods from the
other country after the achievement of full free trade in goods. Rather,
anti-competitive conduct is to be subject to the two countries' competition (that is, anti-trust) laws.
In deciding to abolish dumping, the two countries recognized that
its retention would be anomalous in the context of their efforts to achieve
a single market. In an open trans-Tasman market, the different thresholds for anti-dumping and competition laws would have led to the protection of relatively inefficient industries in the trans-Tasman context and
hence would have hampered the efficient allocation of resources between
the two countries. Moreover, it was felt that the removal of trade barriers would make dumping increasingly redundant as the scope for price
discrimination between the domestic and export markets is reduced, and
the risk of retaliation by competitors increases, with the possible occurrence of arbitrage. Continuation of the anti-dumping remedy would also
have enhanced the possibilities for prolonged disputation at an official
level-a problem that has periodically characterized Australia/New Zealand trade relations-to the detriment of what is beneficial in the commercial relationship. As with other areas of CERTA, the two
Governments were concerned to establish provisions which did not entail
bureaucratic regulation and enforcement, but, rather, enabled enforcement action by commercial parties directly affected.
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In developing the elements of this package, the Australian Attorney
General's Department and the New Zealand Justice and Commerce Ministries had a series of discussions during a period of over one year. There
was already a significant degree of compatibility between the competition
laws of New Zealand and Australia because the competition law provisions of the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 were closely modeled on
those of Part IV of the Australian Trade PracticesAct 1974. Nevertheless, differences in constitutional frameworks, drafting style and policy
objectives contributed to some differences between the two pieces of legislation. There were also extensive consultations with representatives of
business and professional organizations, as well as with Federal and High
Court judges from both countries about jurisdictional aspects. Although
some in the Australian and New Zealand agricultural and manufacturing
sectors expressed concern about the removal of anti-dumping procedures, overall there was a significant level of industry and business support for the Governments' goals.
It is worth noting, in this context, that Australia, at least, has used
trade remedy procedures to a considerable extent in the past to prevent
harm to domestic industries and that this has included actions against
imports from New Zealand. Between 1985 and 1988 some thirty-one
anti-dumping or countervailing cases against New Zealand were accepted in Australia for formal investigation. Of these, three resulted in
anti-dumping duties being imposed and eight were resolved by
undertakings.
In order to implement Article 4 of the Protocol, the two Governments agreed to extend the prohibitions on the anti-competitive use of
market power in Section 36 of the New Zealand Commerce Act and Section 46 of the Australian Trade Practices Act to cover the use of market
power within the combined trans-Tasman markets. This was accomplished in Australia by the insertion of a new provision, S.46A into the
Trade Practices Act, which is modelled on S.46. A corresponding provision, S.36A, was inserted into the New Zealand legislation. (The specific
legislation in Australia is the Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-Tasman
Market Power) Act 1990 and in New Zealand, the Commerce Law Reform Act 1990 and the Law Reform (MiscellaneousProvisions)Act 1990).
The legislation extends competition law provisions to trans-Tasman
trade in goods, and goods and services, but not trade exclusively in services. S.36A of the New Zealand Commerce Act, prohibits any persons
with a dominant position in a market in Australia and/or New Zealand
from using that position to restrict entry into, or to deter competition in,
or to eliminate a person from, a market in New Zealand. S.46A of the
Australian Trade PracticesAct provides that a corporation with a "substantial degree of market power in a trans-Tasman market" must not
seek to eliminate or substantially damage a competitor, or prevent the
entry of a person, or deter competition, in a market in Australia. The
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only exception to these laws is where the market in Australia or New
Zealand is exclusively for services.
A number of further changes were made to the Trade PracticesAct,
the Federal CourtofAustralia Act and the Evidence Act, along with reciprocal measures by New Zealand, to enable the new provisions to operate
effectively. These amendments provide for innovative procedures to ensure that trans-Tasman competition law proceedings are hampered as little as possible by national boundaries. It was agreed, for example, that
the Australian Trade Practices Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission would be given new investigatory powers to obtain
evidence in the other country for the purpose of enforcing the new transTasman prohibitions on the anti-competitive use of market power. Thus,
the New Zealand Commerce Commission is empowered to issue a notice
requiring an Australian company to supply information and documents
needed for it to investigate a complaint. Failure to comply is an offence
under the Australian Trade Practices Act. In addition, the relevant
courts of each country will be able to sit in the other country or to take
evidence and submissions by means of video-link or telephone. Judgements and orders, including injunctions, made by each court in transTasman market proceedings will be readily enforceable by registration in
the corresponding court in the other country.
Both Commissions have stressed their willingness to assist businesses in interpreting the new legislation. They have also announced
their intention to keep each other informed and to cooperate in the administration and enforcement of the legislation. Consistent with this approach, the Commissions have issued a joint statement concerning their
enforcement priorities and intentions. It is envisaged that in appropriate
circumstances, one Commission will undertake preliminary investigations of facts on behalf of the other and also that joint investigations may
be carried out.
We can obtain some idea of how the new arrangements will function
by noting that S.46A closely parallels that existing provisions in S.46
aimed at preventing abuses of market power and that the Australian
Trade Practices Commission has indicated that it will adopt a broadly
similar approach in dealing with cases under S.46A as it has with those
under S.46. The Trade Practices Commission's guidelines on S.46 categorizes conduct into that which it believes does not generally restrict
competition, that which may and that which does. In considering complaints under S.46 (and S.46A) that the Trade Practices Commission will
take into account whether the conduct in question adversely affects the
competitive process in a market; adversely affects consumers in terms of
price, quality, availability, choice and/or convenience; raises the costs of
entry to a market or prevents or hinders potential competitors from entering the market; and whether the conduct is justified in terms of efficiency or the desire to engage in genuine competitive rivalry.
The New Zealand Commerce Commission has indicated that it will
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give priority to enforcing the law against conduct which is seen as having
a widely detrimental effect on competition in the market. New Zealand's
approach focuses firstly on the concentration of market power in the
market in question. The Commerce Commission would then move on to
examine the relevant practice in terms of the wording of the legislation.
The emphasis does not range from one list of practices to another (as in
the case of the Australian legislation) but, rather, from lower to higher
concentrations of market power. The Commerce Commission seeks to
avoid making any a priorijudgements about particular practices. It is,
of course, too early to make a full assessment of the implications of the
decision to abolish anti-dumping provisions for trans-Tasman trade. To
date, no case has been initiated under the new legislation. However, the
general view is that the removal of anti-dumping measures has been an
important element in opening up the trans-Tasman market to complete
free trade in goods and to securing the maximum economic efficiency and
welfare gains from the operation of a single market. The challenges for
the future include the complete incorporation of trade in services into the
CERTA regime.

